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EDI'l'ORIAL 
BRIDGES '1'0 PEACE 
Difficult times and problems ca l l  for extraordinary measures .  There 
seems to be a consen sus that the 1980s have thus far presented 
extraordinary problems in humanity ' s  quest for peace . Many more 
obstac les to  peace have been raised than cleared . Many Christians , East 
and West , therefore , have redoubled their efforts in peacemaking and 
have attempted to build b ridges between the antagonis ts in the hope that 
th ey may help pr event the tension from erupting into a nuclear 
holoc aus t .  
In this issue we are dealing with some recent peacemaking efforts . 
They a re linked to an artic le in the previous is sue by Paul Oestreiche r ,  
who de scribed the peacemaking activities o f  the East German churches .  
They s tress peacemaking efforts between American and Soviet Christians , 
but without trying to be comprehensive in approach . 
Fir s t ,  we present an artic le by Bruce  Rigdon , a former chairperson 
and vice-chairperson of CAREE , · and now the chairperson of the 
u.s .-U . S . S . R .  Church R elations Committee of the National Council of 
Churches of Chri st . He describes a visit by 26 6 Ameri can Christians to 
the Chur ches of the Sovi et Union in June , 1 984 .  Those of us who know t he 
organizers of the tour and conditions in the Soviet Union know that it 
was carefully planned a nd well-organiz ed ,  and that its purpose of 
en couraging Christians from the two superpower s  to recommit themselves 
to wo rk for peace was i ndeed a succes s .  Rigdon ably stated the goals ,  
the theological underpinning , and the limi tations of thi s trip.  
The pres s  coverage of the tour , howeve r ,  indicates that the 
j ournalists found plenty to criticize in the trip; mo s tly , appareently , 
for the group not having done things which they never set out to do in 
the first place . They also were faulted for having found some good 
things in the Soviet Union . Finding anything good in the USSR ,  of 
cour se , make s one suspect of being gullibl e .  
The second article , by Alan Geye r ,  deals  with the issue of t he 
pre ss ' s  response. Alan G eyer is  a long-time member of the CAREE Advi sory 
Committe e .  I know of no one who more ably joins knowledge of theology 
and political science into perceptive scholarly analyses of the current 
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political , international , a nd\ armaments situation . He describes t he 
processes of repeating faul ty news analyses without checking out the 
dependability of the initial analyse s .  This not only compounds the error 
and misle ads huge numbers of reader s  but , in this case , also does damage 
to the National Council of Churches .  Add to these slanted news analyses 
the articles commis sioned by the "new right" movements ( such as  Rael J .  
Isaa c  1 s "Mainline Church Activism" and Joshua . Muravchik 1 s "The National 
Council of Churches and The U .S .S . R . "--article s  which , by the way , lack 
any s chol arly validity ) a nd a picture of manipulation emerges . Many 
people in the U .S .A .  a re misinformed about the U .S .S . R .  and about the 
state of religion in the Soviet Union . If the question arises as to who 
profits by this del iberate or "innocent" distortion , the answer seems to 
be that it is those who s eek to deepen mutual hostilities .  Groups such 
as "Bridge s to Peace , "  Clergy and Laity for Peace , Fel lowship for 
Reconciliation , the Institute for Peace and Understanding , CAREE , and 
the N .C . C .  1S U .S . -U . S .S . R .  Church Relations Commi ttee are not able to 
provide the balance which i s  needed to obtain a more truthful picture . 
With this issue of OPREE we seek to make our contribution to truth , 
because putting together s everal half-truths of the press and the 
neoconservative analys t s ,  we feel , lead to total error. 
To round out this is sue we publish Dr . Pedro Ramet 1 s " Hypotheses on 
the Nat ionali ties Factor in Soviet R el igious Pol icy . "  Profe s sor Ramet1S 
training in social sciences and his voluminous research provides the 
reader with helpful theoretical propositions dealing with the complex 
interrelationship between religion and the bewildering number of 
nationalities with which the Soviet governmental apparatus is trying to 
cope. 
* * * * * 
During the month of October 1984 "Bridges to Peace" (an ecumenical 
group based in Vermont and New Hampshire} brought a group of about a 
dozen cle:rgymen from the Soviet Union to the U .S . A .  in the hopes of 
en abl ing more of us to have first-hand contacts with Soviet Christians.  
I had the opportunity to interpret and moderate at two such meetings ,  
on e in York , PA , the other in West Chester , PA· . The se sessions disturbed 
me de eply . Part of.my being disturbed was the immense ignorance betrayed 
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by the large r segment of the audience and the bitter prejudices and 
an tagonism displayed by some fundamentalists and emigrant groups thinly 
veiled by a supposed concern for dissenter s and religious liberties in 
the Soviet Union . But the greater c ause of concern was that the four 
cle rgy did not tell the truth about conditions ,  particularly the 
religious condition s, in their country . 
Why? What makes them say things which are blatantly fa l se? What 
makes them inept in at least hinting at areas of difficulty , except in 
ve ry r are , mo stly implicit private conversations with a few people ? The 
IYOSt obvious reason_is that they do not know with whom they are dealing . 
Their own context taught them caution , c aution which can be removed only 
after year s ,  perhaps decade s ,  of friendship and sharing . These 
conditi ons obviously did not exist during their visi t .  They know how 
quickly we in the West publish anything they may say out of the ordinary 
that can ge t them , their loved ones , and their churches into trouble . 
One can say ,  then,  that the Soviet clergy have very different 
experiences from our own . Their concept of religious freedom ( freedom. 
which they themselves never experienced in the measure which their 
Wes tern counterpart s have) is different. They may simply believe that 
they do have religious freedom . With regul arity they tended to say that 
since the Soviet laws say they have religious freedom that this must 
mean that they have it! Being the product of their society , they may 
ha ve simply fa llen prey to the same propaga nda manipulation to which the 
citizens of their country have been so massively subj ected . 
One may add to this interpretation that those clergy who are chosen 
to trav el on such missions are beholden to the state authorities . Such 
travel is a rare privilege . They are carefully screened and briefed . By 
s aying what the government expects them to say (by means of self­
censorship) they are preserving these opportunit.ies . Some of them may 
simply look at what the advantages of such contacts to the church are,  
and wh at the advantages  to the government are , and feel that the 
t rade-off is profitable to the church . They also know that the 
disadvantag e s  to themselves , and more importantly to their churche s ,  if 
they s t ep out of line , are simply not worth taking such risks .  
Thus many of us have groped , mo stly intuitively ,  to figure out the 
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behavior of these brothers as  well  as many others whom we meet at 
vari ous meetings who oft en behave in ways analogous to the vi siting 
clergymen. Our intuitive answers are sometimes closer and sometimes 
fa rther away from a helpful interpretation, usually depending upon the 
degree of knowledge of the situation in Eastern Europe . But something 
rore dependable is needed . We need some theoretical framework , some 
careful ana lysis of behavior patterns of the leading clergy from the 
Soviet Union. Such theoretical works are now s tarting to appear.  Some of 
them are coming from Eastern Europe itself , some even written by 
Marxists. One su ch was the book by the Pole Czeslaw Milos , The Captive 
Mind , whi ch appeared in the West about thirty years ago . In a recent 
study by the Yugoslav phi loJ ogi s t  from Belgrade University, Nikola 
Mil osevic , "Socij alna psihologi j a  stalj inizma" 1 [ The Socia] Psychology 
of Stalini sm ] , as yet untranslated into English,  Milos
"
evic applied 
Mil o� ' s analogy of the behavior of people under Stalinism with the 
Persian phenomenon of ketman. Ketman is a behavioral pattern of a person 
under gr eat duress who says exactly what is  expected of him or her , 
sometimes even in an ex aggerated way , in order to protect within himself 
or hersel f a bel ief whi ch is diametrically different f:tom what he or she 
publically states.  A person taking such a statement at fa ce value would 
totally mi sunderstand the "actor . " I n  order to present MiloS'evic ' s 
thesi s  we are here reproducing the English summary of his article.  
The author rej ects the widely accepted thesis that the 
persistence of Stalinist regimes is essentially due to the 
us e of manipulative techniques .  Sucl1 regimes are primari ly  
bas ed on terror or  the threat of  terror , where terror is 
def ined as institutionalised coercion not sub j ect to 
recognized forms of moral and legal restraint . 
Thi s  method of total domination is naturally unfavour­
able to the inte rio risation of official ideology , and thus 
the social psychology of Stalinism i s  founded on a 
specific kind of " double-think , "  which is only superfici­
al ly simi lar to the psychological mechanism of introj ec­
tion : in Stalinist societies people behave as actors ,  and 
their devotion to the official ideology is more pretended 
than real. Dif ferent forms this "acting " could take are 
il lustrated by a number of typical examples. 
Neverthele s s ,  genuine interiorisation of official 
ideology occurs under Stalinism , whi ch shows that manipu­
lation is not totally ineffective in this type of 
political regim e .  The decisive factors here are the degr ee 
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of education and the fact,  so typical. of totalitarian 
regimes ,  that there is a �nopoJ.y over the means of 
information and communication. 
From my expe rience in the Soviet Union and Easter.n Europe I find 
Mil osevic ' s  thesi s and analysis convincing . I have witnessed it many 
times  as  I grew up in Yugoslavia. It seems to me that the statements of 
the visit i ng clergy a nd those similar to them fall into the category of 
ketman or " double-think . "  Some of them may del iberately overstate the 
case o f  religious freedom , hoping that there might be people in the 
audience sensitive enough to realize the absurdi ty of their claim and 
the r efore conclude correctly that the exact opposite of what they claim 
is the case. Others have "genuinely interi ori z ed "  what the regime wants 
them to believe! 
The reason for thi s behavior i s ,  of cour s e ,  terror . Terror is  the 
very core of totalita rianism. Many Marxists have found the courage to 
at tack Stalird sm as the main culpri t ,  but few have dared to trace it 
directly to Lenin . That is exactly what Kosta Cavo�ki of the Institute 
for Comparati ve Law in Belgrade has done. I n  hi s article , "Revolucion­
arni makij avel izam"
3 
[Revolut ionary Machi avellianism ] ,  c"avoski makes a 
paral lel between Machiavel l i ' s  ideas and their application in Bolshevik 
t:hought and practice in the form of revolutionary Machiavellianism .  
Cavo�ki points out that Lenin a nd the Bolsheviks pursued policies with 
regard only for practical ef ficacy of their action s ,  completely 
disregarding moral considerations . Thus the Bolsheviks used terror in 
al l forms both for the achi evement of the interest of the state and for 
the personal interest of the ruler ,  which did not necessari ly coincide 
with the interest of the state. The diffe rence between Machiavelli  and 
Lenin is  that the former had realistic goal s  while the latter followed 
ut opian goals  stemming from hi s Marxist heri tage . Lenin often ordered 
the murder of innocents without any judicial proces s ,  s ince he knew that 
even the most cal lous court could never order the execution of 
chi ldren.
4 
In my view ,  such unpr ecedented terror and total departure from 
legal a nd moral restraints a re still being practiced in the Soviet 
Uni on. Th e  terror , of cour s e ,  is  no longer directed at everyone as it 
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was during the Bolshevik revolution and during S talin ' s  times . Now 
.terror is selective ; it can crush anyone who dissents or who in any way 
stands in the path of the rul ing elite.  Knowledge that this terror can 
be unleashed at any moment against any given person is  a suffici ent 
threat against all but the oost brave . Among Soviet bel i evers there a re 
such pe ople of courage . But the vast majority , including the leaders ,  
chose a path of  prudent conpliance with the requests of those with the 
power to unleash the terror . 
It is my conviction that this analysi s  provides the most adequate 
answer as to why our visitors gave such rehearsed answE!rs . They may have 
been victims of manipulation ; they may have traded off benef i ts ; they 
may not know a ny better ;  but , above all , they a re afraid . Under the 
impact of fear they have interi ori z ed  convictions whi ch benef i t  the 
ru le r s .  Otherwise they could never , from the perspective of their 
religious ethics which respects fundamental personal rights , condone the 
amoral pol i cy according to whi ch any and every means i s  acceptable in 
pursuit. of the ends dict.ated by the ruling Communi st Party elite .  
Not a ll Marxists fol low Machiavellian t·evolutionarism of  the 
Bol shevik type . Some Marxis ts never embraced it. Others , like some of 
the Yugosl av Marxists , are s truggling to extricate themselves from t he 
di aboli cal hol d  of thi s doctrine. But the doctrinaire Marxist-Leninists 
of Eastern Europe all subsc ribe to i t ,  following it to a greater or 
lesser degr ee in every country of Eastern Europe . 
Both Western conservatives and liberals tend to be bl ind in one 
eye , fa i ling to notice one part of Soviet reality. Conservati ves fail to 
see the change s ,  as is apparent from the way the media handled the vis it 
of the N . C . C .  delegat ion. L iberals fai l  to see the continuities and 
inte rpret every improvement in Eastern Europe as the dawn of a new era . 
The change i s  that terror is no longer general . That i s  an improvement . 
The continui ty is  that terror , now selective , is nevertheless still 
terror! Couple thi s terror with the over whelming amount of government 
propaganda ( few or no alternative viewpoints available)  and one gets a 
fa irly adequate theoretical interpretation for the behavior of many of 
the vis i t i ng clezgy , as well as laity contacts in Eastern Europe. 
Should we continue to invite them? By all means.  But let us 
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understand them . Above a nd beyond the theoretical explanation should 
come our Chri stian mandate to love them , understand them, and help them 
in the ir predicament. 
1 . 1 NJ.ko a Mil oS'evic , 
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